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HAROLD LINSTONE: [recording begins mid-sentence] ...start off with by telling you about a
project sponsored by the United Nations to define and clarify the concept of systems. They
prepared a statement and various countries did studies and then came back with these studies.
The Germans came in after a year with a report, a thirteen-volume treatise called An
Introduction to Systems Science. The Russians came in with a book with the title, The Systems
Approach as a Tool of Capitalism. [laughter] The French had a rather small volume called The
Story of F: Confessions of a Systems Analyst. The Chinese had a little red-colored booklet called
Mao's Thoughts on Systems. The Italians had a book entitled Roman Traffic: a Case Study in
Applied Systems Analysis. And the American contribution was a book with a rather fancy cover,
looseleaf bound, called Sixty Ways to Beat the Stock Market and Improve Your Love Life with a
Systems Approach. [laughter]
It will become obvious to you that there are… it is rather difficult to give nice, clear, simple
explanations, because what we're dealing with is basically complex. I first really heard the word
"systems" used in the 1940s; Bell Telephone labs was designing new, rather complex telephone
networks; the radiation lab at MIT was, in the 40s, working with radar systems which were
complicated. Notice these were very application-oriented "systems." Von Bertalanffy was
approaching the idea from a more theoretical point of view really based in biology, what he
called "general systems theory." The key features of all of these are a) you're dealing with new
and future concepts. New systems, design of new concepts, worrying about the coming rather
than, let's say, how to best use existing systems. The order of operations research was of

course already… also became very well known at that time. It really got its start in how to use
existing systems better. Search problems and things of the sort. So one key concept is the idea
of worrying about the new, designing the new.
The other problem was complexity. In fact Norbert Wiener had a definition of systems at one
point where he said, "The system is organized complexity." Now, the way you organize it
doesn't have to be necessarily through a tremendous amount of mathematics; it can be… for
example, Herman Kahn once said, "The simplest system approach is making a list." A list of
choices, a list of alternatives. Now, what are some of the characteristics of complex systems?
The reason I want to mention these is because when we talk in an educational environment,
and when you deal with systems, you inevitably have to break quite a few taboos, and I'm going
to mention quite a number of fallacies which are rampant and are still being propagated in the
kind of institutions which we have, whether it's in government, whether it's in the university,
and so on.
The first fallacy, you might say, is that the total of the whole is equal to the sum of its parts.
Something which in geometry seemed to be reasonable enough, but you know very well, if you
think about it, that a symphony is not simply a collection of scores or instrumental scores. A
symphony involves more than a sum of parts. The world problematique, really the whole
problem of survival in the present situation, is more than an economics problem. Traditionally,
the way we have approached science and technology—and it's not been very successfully,
obviously—is through dividing a complex problem into parts. Subdividing,
compartmentalization; in Europe they call it Balkanization. Kenneth Boulding, in fact, right here
at this school once said that the name of the devil is Sub-optimization. And Heinz von Foerster,
if he doesn't mind my quoting one of his laws, maybe he'll get into some of the others, but I
think it's your first law which says that "The more profound the problem which is ignored, the
greater are the chances for fame and success."
Now that's quite reasonable, because if you're stuck with a complex problem the most obvious
thing to do is keep cutting off parts of it until you… and if you still can't solve it, reduce it some
more until you get to something you can solve. So it's bound to be a success and very often it
ends up in a Ph.D. dissertation.
Another fallacy is that the best solution for the parts is the best solution for the whole. In other
words, if you take it and try to do the best you can with each of the parts, you have then got
the best solution for the total. Joe Coates called something very related to this "the fallacy of
the second best." Namely when all conditions for an optimum cannot be met, the strategy is to
meet as many of the conditions as possible.

Again, it sounds reasonable enough, until you work with complex systems. Often, and this
shocks—as I say, you have to break a few heads in the process—and it shocks quite a few
people after they've been brainwashed in any educational system, to learn that there are
systems that have no optimum; that there may not be a best solution. When you've been
through lots of courses where every problem in the book is practically asking for a best
solution. You heard Buzz Holling talk this morning about the problem of safe fail situations,
which may be much more critical than the problem of the best solution, because of the
complexity; hence the uncertainty, the unknown. You find out that inefficient systems, from a
strictly technical sense, inefficient systems tend to also be more survivable than highly efficient
systems. You as an individual don't operate at maximum efficiency, although you may delude
yourself you do. But it also at the same time makes you more survivable.
Then there is something called "Gresham's Law," which can be applied, and again it's something
which... you're used to dealing with quantifiable items, many of you who study come from the
hard sciences, and even the soft sciences these days. You measure what is easily measurable.
You disregard that which cannot be readily measured. That tends to be misleading. You
presume that which cannot be easily measured is unimportant. That's blindness. And worst of
all, you presume that that which cannot be easily measured does not exist. That can be suicide.
In other words, we have the situation that so often, quantitative analysis tends to drive out
qualitative analysis. And we have to do a lot of unteaching and unlearning in this area.
A good example is to use the GNP, the Gross National Product, as a measure of the quality of
life, because it's something that's definable and I can generate numbers, and I have it in the
yearbooks, so that's what I use. But these complex systems that we're talking about have
peculiar characteristics. They have long lag times. For example, if you wanted to stabilize the
world population starting right now and you took the necessary steps, it would probably take
about 75 years to do the job. It's not something… it's like a big ocean liner; you can't turn it
around on a dime. You have the problem of stability and instability. The very curious
characteristics, which were very beautifully discussed this morning.
Let me mention another fallacy as a kind of thing I just cannot resist. Science has... inculcates
the idea of objectivity. We're objective. We deal with data, and obviously data is objective. I
think that's a fallacy. Data is highly subjective. Just ask people, for example, who've witnessed
an accident what they saw, and the different stories that you get from observation. The way we
select what we define as data from the real situation is subjective. Again, the kind of example…
subjective for example… to illustrate in the way we select quantifiable information as opposed
to things which are difficult to quantify. So we have the problem of so-called objectivity; you

get this problem by talking about probabilities, the idea that I, for example, I used to do a risk
analysis in business, and we were dealing with an advanced technology business. We went to
the engineers and said, "You're building a new vehicle; what is the risk that you'll be fifty
percent over your cost estimate?" A very relevant question. They would say, "Well, we don't
have a database. We haven't done this a lot of times. How can we give you a probability?"
They're used to the concept of probability the way you toss a coin: the ratio of the number of
successes to the number of total trials as that ratio approaches infinity. The fact that you have
such a thing as subjective probability, most of them don't even know. Very few places even
teach courses in subjective probability, which you might define as a degree of confidence. And
yet, the same engineer who refuses to give you information on this chance of overrun because
it's a one-time occurrence, has no compunction at all about making a bet on a football game or
a Muhammed Ali boxing match, which is a one-time occurrence, right? And he knows, and he
uses odds. He accepts that perfectly well, but in his work it's a different life.
Then you have the problem that everything interacts with everything. Let me give you an
illustration of how subtle… because we've gotten into the subject of technology assessment,
looking at the impact of technology on society, and how subtle this can be. There was recently a
study done, very interestingly enough not by a technologist, but a historian. It was entitled
Technology Assessment from the Stance of a Medieval Historian. That's very instructive. It is
instructive to look at the past. In the Middle Ages… let me take the example of mass production
of books.
Now, you all know... the first thing that would come to your mind if I asked you, "What were
key elements in making the mass production of books possible?" You would say, "The printing
press." Gutenberg. I would counter… or this article suggests the situation's much more
complex. You needed good paper, and lots of it, to have mass production of books. Now the
spinning wheel came to Europe in the 12th-13th century, and if you were an analyst at that
time, you would have clearly said, "The mechanical way of looking at weaving should make
clothing cheaper." Okay? And if you'd really been a farsighted and total picture analyst, you
would have said, "Maybe children's health will improve because poor children can afford to be
dressed warmer in a cold winter in Europe, get less pneumonia, less disease because of the
spinning wheel." It would have never occurred to you at all to relate this to books. What has the
spinning wheel got to do with books? Well, linen was one of the most popular materials in the
Middle Ages. Bedding, clothing made of linen at that time. So you were weaving linen, and
having cheap linen clothing ultimately meant we were getting cheap linen rags. And now
maybe the light lights up. Linen rags is a very good source of high-quality paper. Remember, if
you go and buy stationery... say “rag content,” so much. So here you have the spinning wheel

having a direct and very significant relation, just as much as the printing press, to the mass
production of books.
Another example is the genius who invented the chimney. He had an impact on social
stratification. Why? 'Cause in the old days you think of the castle in the winter in Europe; all the
cold. Everybody was around a central area with a fire to keep people warm, and you had to live
in pretty close physical proximity to keep warm. The man who invented the chimney made it
possible to have chimneys all over in different parts of the castle, and of course the first thing
that happens is the lord and lady move to their own quarters and don't associate so closely with
the servants anymore: the origin of the upstairs-downstairs concept. And that's therefore
something which should have been of great significance in regard to technology like the
chimney.
With the automobile, how many people in the 1920s concerned themselves with the concept of
what does this to the family, what does this do to suburban sprawl, and in the case of the
family, does it have any relation to divorce rate? So we're talking about rather subtle things,
and as Hardin said, Garrett Hardin, "You can never merely do one thing." This is one of the
lessons you learn. If we could have the slide... could you? Let me give you an illustration…. The
latest book of the Club of Rome has a very simple such illustration, and this concerns the world
food supply. There are lots of people going around saying, "The way to solve the world food
supply is to have a three or four percent increase in the economic growth." The question is, can
people eat dollars? That's the first box, the economic solution. The second one is a science
solution. It's possible to increase the yield substantially in a laboratory… there's plenty of
evidence, so that on paper we can feed 30 billion people. 30 billion. Much more than we have
today, or expecting even in the year 2000. The only question with the second technological or
scientific approach is that you want to bring people together with food. That's one of the
problems at least. Just because you have that ability does not mean it's going to be successfully
applied.
So, we have the problem of population. Is there the infrastructure to make this work? How
much food can be produced in time and for the populations which actually need it, which are
very unevenly distributed throughout the world? Okay, you say, that's the whole system. But
then you've got to figure if you're going to produce all this food, you're gonna have to start
producing a lot of other things. You're going to be using chemicals on a very vast scale, you're
going to be reducing the diversity in nature because it'll… simply a lot of crops and other things
you'll have to squeeze out to do this. So you'll be eliminating other species in supplying all this
food. Now you've got the problem of ecology. And I think this morning you got a pretty good
idea of the sophistication of such an ecological system.

Then you've got the question, you say "All right, suppose we are able to include that, isn't that
enough?" And the answer is it still isn't because now you'll have to worry about sociopolitical
arrangements. Some regions are going to be producing their foods, other regions are going to
be using it. The immediate question comes up: how will this food be used as a weapon? As a
political instrument? So you've got the sociopolitical context. Is this the whole system? No,
because you're also dealing with individuals, not just groups. Dealing with individual values;
people have to change their eating habits, people have to change even their religious attitudes
to permit this kind of approach. Sacrifices will be needed by some to give more food to the
others. So you have the problem of the individual. So that you finally have this large
conglomeration as a total system.
And it is therefore very tricky and very dangerous to do what we attempted to do, particularly
the United States. We say, for example, if we have to make trade-offs, if we have an energy
shortage, you've seen in the press plenty of reports would say, "Well, what you've got to do
then, obviously, is relax environmental standards. You've got to take your choice; do one or the
other." If you want more gas mileage in the cars, you'd better stop adding onto the safety
requirements like bumpers and so on, and drop those standards down.
In many ways, these systems—and I think this was already apparent and I'm sure will be
apparent from some of the other talks—behave in what most of us would view as a counterintuitive manner. I'm reminded of a headline I just saw in the Oregon Journal on February 15.
The headline says, "Computer Says Ford Plan Ranks with Doing Nothing," referring to the
energy economy plan proposed by Ford. Certainly, to a lot of people, that kind of conclusion
would be counter-intuitive. I assume it would be to him. What do we do? Well, what we do
already ties in with another fallacy. It's called a fallacy of argument from incompetence, which
says, "If I cannot see how to solve a problem, it is unsolvable." As German poet Goethe said,
"There is nothing more terrifying than ignorance in action."
Let me give some illustration that may be familiar to some of you, at least in one area of system
dynamics. The problem of... from the original Jay Forrester work, trying to look at the world as a
system. Now, this looks fairly simple. There were originally five variables. Population, capital
investment, natural resources, the fraction of capital devoted to agriculture, and pollution.
Obviously all important. And the way this kind of thing works just for those of you familiar with
the general concept, we have here population in the middle, the rectangular box, and
population results in… if you know the normal death rate, you can calculate the number of
deaths in a certain time increment. That of course will affect the population in a similar way
with the number of births, assuming a certain birth rate will create new population, so you have

these feedback loops. Feedback is a very essential element in looking at systems. Now you say,
this looks all very simple, where's the complexity? Just keeping in mind those five variables, this
is what you get. Just for those five variables. The five variables are these rectangles. This one's
population… this is what I showed in the previous slide. So it doesn't take much to develop
complexity, and of course people criticize this particular model as being highly oversimplified.
Another thing we find out is that we talk a lot about… well, let me first show you what happens
with this kind of thing. Typical kind of charts which are now pretty widely known, and a lot of
people are looking into this kind of thing and improving and working in this kind of area of
systems dynamics; here you have shown the variables such as natural resources, population,
and this goes from 1900 to 2100. In other words, the way the model is derived to take the
information which we know from 1900—population, pollution, et cetera—from 1900 to 1970
and make sure that if you started in 1900 and let the model work incrementally through to
1970, you in a sense get a reasonable picture of what's happened over 70 years. Which should
satisfy a lot of people; 70 years is a big database. And then you run it on into the future. And
you see that you get the province of pollution rises to much higher levels and you get declines;
you get this typical complex system behavior, then you say, well we want to use this thing as a
learning device. We want to see how to improve it. For example, here, what they defined as
quality of life in this particular case peaked; in fact, it's already peaked around 1950 or so. And
it's declining; we don't like that, so the question is what do we do about it, and typically we look
at certain steps that seem reasonable and seem intuitive, such as let's stop using natural
resources up at the rate that we have. If you look at the previous chart, we're talking about this
curve here, and that's why today we stop using up the resources at the same rate, so they don't
deplete as much and so we have a break in this curve. Instead of going down, it's flatter. We're
using up… recycling more, using up at a lesser rate. And lo and behold, that really doesn't help
the situation because we get instabilities.
You notice the population is now going through a drastic decline and then goes up again. The
first implication is naturally to blame the model. And you say that can't happen, it's never
happened before. Of course you're wrong, because it has happened before, and you can go
back into history and people have done this. In fact in the transition from the Middle Ages to
the Renaissance, and if you include in pollution, disease is a form of pollution, and you
remember the plagues decimating cities, a fifty-percent population drop in a very short time in
some cities, eighty percent in some. You see that this pattern is not at all unnatural. We did get
an increase, in fact showing what shows up here, the increase in the quality of life after this
catastrophic situation has happened, and that is what we properly call the Renaissance,
following the Middle Ages. So we've gotta be very careful. It points up another thing, that we

don't look at the past enough. We don't apply our modern tools to the past. I'll get into that
problem in a minute.
Now, if you think that this kind of thing is kind of a doomsday situation, first of all, let me say
that the reason one does this is not to have this kind of self-fulfilling forecast; you want to have
a self-defeating forecast. You want to make sure this doesn't occur. And that of course is the
essence of the whole idea of looking at these same systems, the same discussion that you
heard earlier this morning on making the system more safe-fail. One of the things that makes
this, in a sense, conservative is the fact that the population's actually—from 1650 on—has been
increasing at a faster rate than what is normally used in these. We always talk now about
exponential growth. Doubling in a given time period. Turns out, if you look at world population
data from 1650 to 1700, world population increased at 0.27 percent per annum. 0.27 percent.
From 1850 to 1900, 0.62 percent. From 1960 to 1970, 1.97. 1971 to '72, over 2 percent per
year.
So we've gone from an annual rate of .27 percent to over 2 percent. That's not exponential. You
can call it hyper-exponential, or in fact it's called hyperbolic. If you continue that trend, this is
what it actually looks like, the… you come out with an infinite population in the year 2026. And
there's been a recent study looking at this. I think one of your studies earlier came out with a
very similar conclusion… what was it? 2025. [response from audience off microphone; audience
laughs and applauds] Now, you know, this is not going to happen on Friday the 13th in
whatever month it is in 2025 or 2026. You know it's not going to happen, but it also suggests
that the trends can continue and that we are in fact in a kind of a phase change today. In other
words, the kind of tool you're most used to using… in fact, even this model is in a sense the
system dynamics model I showed you before, it is a trend extrapolation because you assume
the basic nature of the model, the structure of the model will remain the same. And it cannot
remain the same in this kind of situation. That's where you could say it does not really reflect
the true, realistic situation. You don't let it go to these extreme situations. You try at least to
provide ways to avoid this.
So that you have a very serious type of problem, a type of problem where the typical
forecasting tool which is used—if anybody does forecasting at all most of the time, trend
extrapolation—it becomes more hazardous. And you can't… you really have to go to a kind of
systems concept modeling simulation other ways, including non-quantitative ways to assess
what is happening and what can be done. Let's go back to the problem of resources. You say
well it's a matter of finding… using shale oil, for example, instead of oil directly. We not only
have a problem of depletion, we have a problem of dispersion as you go towards, and of course
increasing expense in getting to the more subtle and more, let's say, deeper layers of the shale

oil extraction, use up more energy, until the problem becomes self-defeating. You use as much
energy to generate the energy that you want to use so that you don't have a net gain at all.
Now if you think that isn't… I was always amused… in talking to technologists, the typical claim
that is made is that agriculture is an outstanding example of the effectiveness of technology.
Because after all in the United States today, less than 4 percent of the population are producing
more than 100 percent of the food requirements. This is a tremendous gain in efficiency. Well,
yes and no. If you think about it, you're also using fuel, and in fact you're using a great deal of
fuel to produce one BTU of food, you may be using 5 or 10 BTUs of energy to produce one BTU
of food. All you've done is switch from human energy to fossil fuel energy. And using it with
extreme abandon. So there's a question of efficiency here. Now you might… the Chinese wet
rice agriculture, for example, is a different story. For one BTU of food input, you get many BTUs,
some calculated 25, 50 BTUs of output in terms of food energy. Now it just gives us here some
food for thought.
The other problem we get to and a very significant one is discounting: discounting of the future.
If you take something like that first standard curve in population that I had from the system
dynamics, that's shown here on the left hand side. This is simply—it's from basically the same
type of data, this curve here, and that's population—all that I've done is essentially normalized
it, so that 1970 becomes unity. So that it goes up to three times that value in 70, 80 years. Fine.
What I'm suggesting here is what we're actually doing. Remember, I've talked about long lag
times to solve problems; what we're actually doing is looking at the future as shown in the
second and third slides. We use essentially a discount rate. The second slide uses one percent
per year, we're all used to doing that with dollars; a dollar that you get in 1980 if you give it to
any businessman even without inflation, that is not worth to him the dollar that he gets next
year because he can reinvest it; put it in a savings account or do something with it to make
more money. So that even without any inflation you have some kind of discount rate; in
business we tend to use some kind of capital. Might be 10 percent a year.
Now on the right hand side you see that with 5 percent a year the crisis has disappeared. And
what I'm saying here is that it's a problem of perception. The crisis hasn't disappeared, our view
of the crisis makes it shrink. It's like looking through the wrong end of a telescope. A problem
that's far in the future we tend to say… or not look at it with a similar seriousness as something
which occurs very soon. The best illustration I have is with the oil problem. In the 1950s, there
were plenty of studies done; 50s, 60s about forthcoming oil shortages. They end up as reports
to the president, like the Paley Commission report, and they're promptly briefed and filed
away. You can't arouse interest. When you can't get gas at your gas station, it's a different

story. Because one looks like a crisis 30 or 40 years away, the other one is an immediate
problem.
We have here another kind of Gresham's law, namely that short-range problems drive out longrange planning. That's true in all organizations; business, government. After all, an elected
official has to worry about reelection and what he can do immediately. The electorate tends to
ask, "But what have you done for me lately?" So that we have this kind of situation occurring
not only in population; this is the same kind of thing with pollution, taken with a zero discount
rate using 1950 as unity, and the tremendous rise in pollution, the topmost curve, and by the
time you get to 5 or 10 percent discounting, you're like the cartoon character in Mad Magazine.
What, me worry? It's too far in the future.
Now here you have some I just took out of a new book, and then worked on it to draw the
other curves. This first curve here is out of the Mesarovic-Pestel book on Mankind at the
Turning Point, where he looks at the problem of providing aid to the poor countries to reduce,
not close, but reduce the gap in economic wealth between the two; per capita GNP or
something of the sort that’s say, three to one with respect to Latin America, five to one respect
to Asia, or South Asia, or Africa. All right, this means we're putting aid from the developed
countries into less developed countries. And we have three alternatives. The first one is that
you start a program in 1975 and carry it out to the year 2000. And this is the annual rate, this is
the annual expenditure here. The second alternative is you don't do anything now, but start at
the year 2000 and let it go on for 25 years until the year 2025. So each of these two are 25-year
programs. This one starts now and it's a slower program that lasts for 50 years.
Now, anybody would conclude that the cheapest program, and therefore the most preferable
one, is to begin immediately and do this alternative here. Now on this chart, we've discounted
at an annual 5 percent. Here you're actually discounting dollars. Notice that this… the
difference between starting in the year 2000 and starting now has virtually disappeared. In
other words, it just looks practically as good if we waited and did nothing. And if we discount 10
percent a year, we see that waiting 25 years is actually better, it's cheaper. It looks cheaper
because of the discounting. So then in a sense we would have come up with different
preferences. So we're talking here about what I consider one of the most fundamental blocks of
effective planning. The fact that a) we're dealing with complex systems, which are not easy to
change... and yet because of discounting, it's very hard to come to grips and get the popular
support, even if we know solutions or we know improvements to these problems. The
implementation of any alleviative steps is extremely difficult.

You can give other examples of this trend. If you look, I think you see it in the papers today, you
look at arguments between doing something for the economy and doing something for the
environment. If you ask the average man, which should we do? If in one case it endangers your
job, which is immediate, as opposed to… but in that case you may live several years longer
because of improved environment, or do the opposite. Most people will vote for doing the
economy at the expense of the environment. One of them has long-range effect, one has short
range. If you ask people… and medical people have done this in terms of trying to get people to
stop smoking to reduce the chance of cancer. There are still a lot of people smoking. And you
see, the idea is that lung cancer takes some time to develop, maybe 10 years. They found that if
they make the argument that their sex life is going to be adversely affected by smoking, it's
much more effective.
It's the same kind of situation; evidence is all over the place. And as long as we do that, we've
got a very difficult problem in addressing some of these world problems and some of our own
planning problems at home. So one of the things we need is a long-range perspective, a future
orientation; we need global scope; we need to take a holistic view rather than tossing out the
bits and pieces. We have to be, in a sense—I wouldn't even say “interdisciplinary” is the right
word—Jantsch used the word "transdisciplinary." We have to stop… we have to actually break
down the barriers. For example, even in business today, there's already a beginning in the
sense that you no longer… you begin to talk about transportation companies rather than
vehicle manufacturers, and in the future we may be talking about combining the idea of
transportation and communications. There are alternatives, in many ways alternatives, and
they need to be looked at together. One's just a matter of transporting people and the other—
or goods or material things—and the other's transporting ideas.
So we have to break down these barriers, and from an academic point of view… oh, let me go
over here a minute. From an academic point of view, it means that you have to... that systems
involves a great deal. It involves not just mathematics or economics; there are aspects of
philosophy and aspects even of art. For example, I talk about holism. Artists are particularly
good at transmitting, at communicating total images, because if the total is not the sum of its
parts, then there are aspects of it that are not going to be possible to communicate in the ways
in which we are used to doing. So, much of this gets in here and much of it is… you can't use
even a philatelic approach. There's a few other things left out here that come into the picture.
But let me go back and at least suggest… when we talk about, for example, the need to address
problems, the need to form teams to address some of these complex issues. One of the obvious
things is that one has to start now; the delay, because the lag times in these systems can be
very, very tough. I'm not saying it's suicidal for mankind or for a city, but it may make a

transition that much more difficult because as we have seen, you go from one state of stability
to another state of stability. It's a question of how much do you want to be in charge of the
transition, the instability, in doing so? Or if you try to avoid it altogether? That's the question.
Let me backtrack and suggest for example, in this case of discounting, some of the ideas I want
us to look at. Now, when we have the situation of a distant crisis or opportunity, our planning
horizon is here. We're here, this is time, and this is physical space or distance. And most people
are interested in the here and now, that's down in this corner. We have a crisis here; one way
to bring about action, to in a sense get it within our planning horizon, is to bring the crisis in.
Now we do that by creating a mini crisis. Now you might say, "Well, that's unethical." In some
cases, it may be. But also let me remind you that it's considered perfectly ethical in some
situations. Unions create a threat of a strike. That's creating an artificial crisis in the near term
to… as opposed to seeing a continual deterioration in a much worse situation later on. That is
one example. In a sense, you might even put the oil embargo in this situation, and it brought a
distant... not intentionally, let's say, but it brought a distant problem near. So people gain
awareness.
There are other ways to do this, and in looking at complex systems, not only… we used this
analogy with a telescope; not only do we have the habit of looking through the wrong end of a
telescope, but we don't even move the telescope around. We keep looking in one direction. By
that, I mean situations that we think of as being future situations for our case may actually be
already existing situations somewhere else. You have today situations of overpopulation, of
tremendous urban deterioration, which we fortunately don't yet have here, so you have these
kinds of situations, and you can… one thing we're very good at, if we have a distant spatial crisis
or situation, we can bring it very close in by telecommunications. Technology is very good at
this. You take a man landing on the moon, you show it in your living room. Very distant event,
very close.
Now, an interesting possibility—this has only recently been really focused on—is to take a
distant temporal problem and see if we have an analogy somewhere today. One of the points
that's been raised is that you have the situation of... the United States today is rather similar to
Sweden twenty years from now, because Sweden is almost a precursor situation; healthcare
was done there first, women's liberation was 15 or 20 years ahead there, and so forth; you can
give a whole number of situations. So there are things we can do in this area. So, another one
of the things that we have to worry about is that we're dealing with unsolved problems, and
unfortunately our brainwashing in the educational system tends to say that all problems are
solvable. Otherwise you wouldn't be given the problems; the answers must be somewhere in

the back of the book. I suggest it's high time we focused in the classroom talking about
unsolved problems than about solved problems.
The question of communication: we're dealing here with a situation where communication is
extremely essential and communications between different types of individuals in different
types of areas. This is the essence of interdisciplinarity; if we cannot communicate, we have
trouble. So the communication becomes a very key aspect. Finally, let me mention that we can
learn to live with complexity, we can train ourselves to do some of the things you'll be hearing
about, you heard about this morning, and you'll be hearing about further. The question is, to
what degree, for example, our educational institutions take the lead. And I always have this
vision of the cartoon where there are a bunch of people running into the distance, and there's
one guy running behind them, waving his hands madly and shouting, "There go my people. I
must follow them, for I'm their leader." And I think there's a lesson in there for our educational
systems today. So the opportunity is there, and the question is whether we are willing to grasp
the nettle. Thank you. [applause]
We have to leave this room, unfortunately, right now, because there's a 12 o'clock meeting in
here, and there will be opportunity for discussion following lunch. I will try to be in room 329...
and we will see you, let me just check… Professor Church will be talking at 1:15 in the ballroom.
[program ends]

